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A Program for the Next ICC 
Prosecutor 
Alex Whiting1 
As the International Criminal Court (ICC) begins the process of 
selecting the next Prosecutor, it finds itself at a critical moment. Few 
people believe that the institution has lived up to expectations. The 
court has brought relatively few cases, and many have not succeeded.2 
While convictions were achieved in the Lubanga, Ntaganda, Katanga, 
and Al Mahdi cases, as well as in the obstruction of justice cases arising 
out of the Bemba prosecution, many other cases failed at the 
confirmation stage, during or after trial, or on appeal.3 he future looks 
grim. Presently, there is just one case at trial (Ongwen) and only three 
in the pipeline (Al Hassan, Yekatom, and Ngäissona).4 Many accused 
remain at large, and some of the investigations being undertaken by 
the Prosecutor (Georgia, Burundi, Afghanistan?) appear to offer little 
prospect of producing actual cases in The Hague.5 As the UK Foreign 
Office stated at the ICC Assembly of States Parties in December 2018,  
The statistics are sobering. After 20 years, and 1.5 billion Euros 
spent we have only three [now four] core crime convictions. As 
others have said, and I quote “it is undeniable that the Rome 
project still falls short of the expectations of the participants at 
that ground-breaking conference in Rome”. The time has come 
for States to take a fundamental look at how the Court is 
operating. We need to work together to address the challenges, 
 
1. Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School; Co-chair of the Editorial 
Committee of the Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
2. Jane Stromseth, Is the ICC Making a Difference?, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 
6, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/47717/icc-making-difference/ 
[https://perma.cc/3RV3-7VSJ]. 
3. See Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3MK2-T3T4]. 
4. Id.  
5. See ICC Prosecutor Calls for Afghanistan War Crimes Investigation, 
NPR (Nov. 3, 2017, 5:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/11/03/561842662/icc-prosecutor-calls-for-afghanistan-war-
crimes-investigation [https://perma.cc/AJ8B-ZQBE]; Nika Jeiranashvili, 
Georgia – A Unique Case For The ICC, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Mar. 8. 
2017), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/03/georgia-a-unique-case-for-the-
icc/ [https://perma.cc/YQ7J-SC2M]; Toby Sterling & Katharine 
Houreld, Burundi Rejects International Criminal Court War Crimes 
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for the future health of the Court, a Court that we care about 
deeply.6 
What are these challenges? In the early years, and particularly at 
the moment of change in 2012 from the first Prosecutor to the second,7 
it might have seemed that they largely concerned issues of personnel, 
management, and policy. Now that the Court is nearly through its 
second prosecutor8, however, it is also clear that there exist problems 
of institutional design. The next Prosecutor will need to chart a path 
that meets these challenges – mindful that there is no realistic option 
to revise the Rome Statute – and find a way to achieve success for the 
institution, however that ends up being defined. The aim of this 
articlewill be to analyze the challenges currently facing the ICC and 
propose a three-part program for the next Prosecutor. Although the 
ICC is a relatively young institution, it may not get many more chances 
to get it right. If the next Prosecutor fails, the institution may never 
recover.  
Much of what has been written about the ICC’s problems, and how 
to fix them, has focused on quality and efficiency.9 The first Prosecutor 
was initially credited for building up the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
and putting the court on the map by moving quickly to bring cases.10 
But later, he was excoriated for bringing thinly investigated cases that 
failed when brought to court.11 The second Prosecutor committed the 
 
6. Andrew Murdoch, Legal Dir. to the Int’l Criminal Ct. Assembly of States 
Parties, UK Statement to ICC Assembly of States Parties at its 17th 
session in The Hague, (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-icc-
assembly-of-states-parties-17th-session [https://perma.cc/2JFU-DL9V]. 
7. Colum Lynch, Bensouda to Replace Moreno-Ocampo as ICC Prosecutor, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 30, 2011, 11:11 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/30/bensouda-to-replace-moreno-
ocampo-as-icc-prosecutor/ [https://perma.cc/HW66-QJ2E]. 
8. See The ICC Prosecutor Elections 2020, COALITION FOR THE INT’L 
CRIMINAL CT. (Aug 7, 2019), 
http://coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20190807/icc-prosecutor-election-2020 
[https://perma.cc/V9DR-Y5NX]. 
9. See, e.g., Int’l Bar Ass’n, Enhancing Efficiency and Effectiveness of ICC 
Proceedings: A Work in Progress 8 (Jan. 2011). 
10. Karen L. Corrie, International Criminal Law, 46 INT’L LAW 145, 151 
(2012) (“While often a lightning rod for criticism, Moreno-Ocampo has 
successfully established a well-functioning structure for the OTP, and 
pushed it to be efficient and proactive.”); Kirsten Ainley, The 
International Criminal Court on Trial, 24 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 
309, 318 (2011) (“[T]he [p]rosecutor . . . . at the ICC [has] shown real 
courage in [his] initial actions.”). 
11. Janet H. Anderson, Ocampo’s Shadow Still Hangs over the ICC, INT’L 
JUST. TRIB. (June 18, 2018), 
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office to a more cautious and deliberate approach and pledged to mount 
more open-ended investigations and to bring cases only when they were 
thoroughly investigated and essentially ready for trial.12 While not all 
of the cases have succeeded during the second Prosecutor’s tenure, there 
has been an improvement in the strength of the cases.13 But one cost is 
that the OTP has brought many fewer cases overall, creating the risk 
of empty courtrooms in the future.14 Commentators continue to urge 
the prosecution to bring stronger cases and to work more efficiently.15 
These remedies are echoed on the side of the judges: more attention is 
being paid to the selection process for judges, and under the direction 
of President Fernandez, the judges undertook efforts to render their 
practices more efficient, particularly in the pre-trial phase.16 
While there certainly continues to be room to improve the quality 




12. Alex Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Announces Important Changes in New 
Strategic Plan, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 24, 2013), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/2215/icc-prosecutor-announces-important-
strategic-plan/ [https://perma.cc/84L7-T6RW].  
13. See Alex Whiting, The ICC’s Afghanistan Decision: Bending to U.S. or 




14. Alex Whiting, Difficult Days Ahead for the International Criminal Court, 
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/35627/difficult-days-icc/ 
[https://perma.cc/GW3C-H6Y4].  
15. See, e.g., Bemba Judgment Warrants Better Investigations and Fair 
Trials – Not Efforts to Discredit the Decision, AMNESTY INT’L, (June 19, 
2018), https://hrij.amnesty.nl/bemba-verdict-warrants-better-
investigations-and-fair-trials/ [https://perma.cc/4ADE-XB82]; Patryk 
Labuda, The ICC’s ‘Evidence Problem,’ The Future of International 
Criminal Investigations after the Gbagbo Acquittal, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG 
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-iccs-evidence-problem/ 
[https://perma.cc/J3AP-7ADH]; Richard Dicker, The Court is Now More 
Important than Ever, ICC FORUM (June 28, 2018), 
https://iccforum.com/anniversary [https://perma.cc/JX7E-5NGN] 
(“The Office has worked to draw lessons from missteps and implement 
better investigative and proofing practices, but it’s a long road to go.”).  
16. See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Strengthen the International Criminal Court, 
CHATHAM HOUSE (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/strengthen-
international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/3V6E-UU2L]; Press 
Release, Int’l Criminal Ct., ICC Judges Agree on Measures to Improve 
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adjudications, there is a growing recognition that the court also faces 
institutional design challenges.17 The single conflict tribunals for 
Nuremberg, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Cambodia have all been, to greater or lesser degrees, successful, if 
success is defined as effectively bringing a range of cases to capture the 
range of criminality that occurred during the conflict at issue.18 But 
scaling up this model to a global court has severely tested the design.19 
While the range of potential activities of the court have dramatically 
increased, the authority and budget of the court have remained the 
same,20 and the political support for the institution has waned and been 
diluted across a broad range of activities.21  
The result is that the ICC is constructed on a series of fault lines. 
On the one hand, its scope of potential activities is vast. Its jurisdiction 
is expansive, covering the territory of 122 States Parties, the actions of 
non-States Parties within the borders of those States Parties, and any 
situations referred to the court by the UN Security Council.22 
 
17. See e.g., Douglas Guilfoyle, Part I- This is Not Fine: The International 
Criminal Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-the-international-
criminal-court-in-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/F4JX-6VPD]. 
18. See Mohammad Rabiul Islam, The International Criminal Court: Its 
Success and Limitations for Pursuing International Justice, 5 J. CIV. & 
LEGAL SERV.  2 (2016); Carolyn Kenney & John Norris, International 
Justice on Trial?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 8–28 (Mar. 2018), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/03/26112219/I
nternationalJustice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3H9-NYYX]. 
19. See Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, Second Vice-President of the Int’l Criminal 
Court, Keynote Address at the Salzburg Law School on International 
Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court - Current Challenges 




20. Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources does the International 
Criminal Court Need to Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017). 
21. See Facing Political Attacks, Limited Budget, International Criminal 
Court Needs Strong Backing to Ensure Justice for Atrocity Crimes, 
President tells General Assembly, U.N. (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12084.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/W289-SAPG]. 
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Accordingly, the court presently has eleven investigations open, though 
several are now largely inactive.23 While the court has jurisdiction over 
just four crimes24, it can prosecute a wide range of acts within the 
context of an armed conflict.25 Additionally, crimes against humanity 
havebeen expansively defined, as illustrated by the broad range of cases 
brought by the court, from the massive killings in Sudan, to the more 
narrow and temporally contained post-election violence in Kenya and 
Côte d’Ivoire.26 Further, the Rome Statute requires the Prosecutor to 
investigate whenever there are grounds to do so.27 Finally, the modes 
of liability under Articles 25 and 28 reach a broad range of conduct and 
actors: essentially any person who intentionally participates in, or 
contributes to, a crime within the jurisdiction of the court may be 
liable.28 Thus, the jurisdiction, law, and procedure of the ICC all push 
the court towards a broad range of investigations across the globe.  
At the same time, the investigative and prosecutorial tools of the 
court are limited,29 the budget is constrained,30 the court’s procedures 
are onerous,31 and the human resources policies stultifying.32 The model 
of the ad-hoc tribunals, and the track record of the early years of the 
ICC, strongly indicate that the international criminal justice project 
succeeds best when there is focus, when a tribunal can concentrate on 
its investigations into a conflict for a sustained period. The scope of the 
ICC’s activities, however, renders such focus difficult, if not impossible.  
Moreover, while the prosecutor is “independent” in the sense of 
being able to decide on cases and priorities on her own, the OTP lacks 
any real independent authority or power to fulfill its mission.33 It is 
 
23. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx [https://perma.cc/D7AX-Y7GZ]. 
24. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works [https://perma.cc/HMD9-HVJ9]. 
25. See id. 
26. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES IN 
AFRICA: STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES (2011).  
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome 
Statute].  
28. Id. art. 25–28. 
29. See id. art. 53–61. 
30. See id. art. 113–18. 
31. See id. art. 62–85. 
32. See id. art. 34–52. 
33. See Anthony Wang, On the Failed Authority of the International Criminal 
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entirely dependent on state cooperation, and to a lesser extent the 
cooperation of non-governmental organizations and international 
institutions, to conduct its business.34 And this cooperation is not a one-
time given affair; it has to remain constant throughout the preliminary 
examination, investigation, prosecution, and ultimate adjudication. The 
ICC has already experienced the devastating effects of cooperation, or 
political support, first being turned on and then later turned off (see 
Sudan, Kenya, Libya, etc.). 35 
And so here exist additional fault lines within the structure of the 
court.  The ICC’s central aim is to investigate and prosecute structures 
of authority, whether state or non-state actors, but it is dependent on 
structures of authority to do so.36 Moreover, pursuant to the 
complementarity principle, the ICC only has jurisdiction if the national 
jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute the 
crimes itself, but when the ICC gains jurisdiction, it usually has to rely 
on these very same national authorities, the ones that could not or 
would not investigate the crimes, to conduct its investigations.37 The 
single conflict tribunals largely succeeded in slipping by these tensions 
because of their focus, longevity, and support from outside actors.38 
These fixes are less available in a global court. The court’s limited 
budget only exacerbates the problem, thinning the resources available 
to confront each situation.  
Further, as compared to the ad-hoc tribunals, the procedures of the 
ICC are more demanding.39 To be sure, as a criminal court, it is 
necessary that the ICC’s processes be rigorous and fully protective of 
defendants’ rights. At the end of the day, the prosecution is required 
to prove individual criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and a criticism of Nuremberg, and to some extent the early days of the 
ad-hoc tribunals, has been that at times these procedures were 
 
34.  See id.; see Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental Organizations and the 
International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, 
39 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 243, 244–45 (2006). 
35. See Alana Tiemessen, The International Criminal Court and the Politics 
of Prosecutions, 18 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 444 (2014). 
36.  Alex Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives at the ICC, in 
THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: PROMISE AND CONSTRAINTS 128, 131 
(Martha Minow ed., 2015) [hereinafter Whiting, Investigations and 
Institutional Imperatives]. 
37. See Understanding the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T83Q-VLET]. 
38. Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives, supra note 36, at 
129–30.  
39. Id. at 130. 
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deficient40. Nonetheless, the particular procedures at the ICC are 
distinctly and remarkably layered, extensive, prolonged, and onerous. 
Beyond providing the accused a fair chance to defend himself or herself, 
they extend the proceedings (allowing opportunities for focus and 
support to dissipate), create excessive opportunities to re-open and 
revisit questions of fact and law, and absorb valuable resources.41  
Finally, prosecutors, judges, and academics often pay little 
attention to human resource concerns, but the “permanence” of the 
ICC may have also subtly, but importantly, changed the workforce 
there. Everyone who went to the single conflict ad-hoc tribunals knew 
that their time at the institution was limited, which for the most part 
created a sense of urgency and helped maintain focus.42 The ICC is 
largely staffed, however, by long-term and even permanent personnel,43 
making it hard to sustain energy and intensity, challenge established 
practices, or introduce new ideas and approaches.  
There are two frequent responses to these institutional design 
challenges. One is to acknowledge and then ignore them, imagining that 
they can simply be willed away. Within this approach we see two kinds 
of appeals. First, appeals to the court just to do better: find better 
evidence, bring stronger cases, find non-witness evidence, make better 
choices and decisions, work more efficiently, and so on.44 Second, 
appealsto states to step up: by increasing the court’s budget and 
providing greater cooperation and political support.45 These appeals are 
necessary and important, and there is without question room to do 
 
40. See Charles E. Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous 




41. See Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives, supra note 36, 
at 139–40. 
42. See generally Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Stresses 
Importance, Urgency, of Restoring Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 
U.N. Press Release SC/8209 (Oct. 6, 2004).  
43. See About, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about 
[https://perma.cc/MA7B-ZJPB]. 
44. See, e.g., Stef Blok, The International Criminal Court Must Do Better. 




45. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Facing Political Attacks, 
Limited Budget, International Criminal Court Needs Strong Backing to 
Ensure Justice for Atrocity Crimes, President Tells General Assembly, 
U.N. Press Release GA/12084 (Oct. 29, 2018) (describing the President 
of the ICC’s request for support from U.N. General Assembly). 
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better and more, but at some point, they run into the realities of the 
court’s structure and design. No amount of hard work or hoping for 
greater cooperation will solve the tensions that are built into the court’s 
foundation. 
The second response is to reconceptualize what the court is and to 
focus less on the ICC as a “court” and more on its role as a beacon or 
model or symbol or spur for others to act.46 Here is where it becomes a 
success simply to begin an investigation (see, e.g., some of the 
commentary on the Afghanistan situation) because it shines a spotlight 
and calls out impunity.47 Here too is where the endlessly discussed, and 
pursued, notion of complementarity comes into play.48 Maybe the ICC 
cannot do much itself, but that is ok because it will incentivize states 
to act and prosecute cases themselves (even though the premise of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction is that the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute 
itself49). There is a narrow truth to both of these notions – the court as 
symbol, and the dynamics of complementarity – but at bottom they 
are limited by their dependence on the court first succeeding as a court. 
The symbolic force of opening an investigation, or the ability to 
motivate states to bring cases themselves, will dissipate and disappear 
if the court proves itself unable to deliver on its core mission. The 
court’s force lies in prosecutions and convictions, not in announcements 
and pronouncements. 
What then to do? Rather than ignoring or sidestepping the court’s 
fundamental design, and the flaws of that design, the new Prosecutor 
should devise a plan to succeed within its present constraints with a 
three-part program to (1) bring more (and smaller) cases, (2) focus the 
work of the court on situations where prosecutions are possible, and (3) 
work with the other organs to amend the procedures and HR policies 
of the institution.  
By far, the most important objective of the next Prosecutor should 
be to bring more cases. Many more cases. The ICC must prove that it 
can succeed at its core mission before it can do anything else, and the 
force of the court, moral or legal or political, will depend on proving 
that it can successfully prosecute cases. While there will be a 
temptation to bring in an outsider to be the next Prosecutor – to shake 
up the court and change direction – that would be a mistake if it ended 
 
46. See Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., International Criminal Court Marks 
Opening of the Judicial Year 2019, ICC-CPI-20190118-PR1430 (Jan. 18, 
2019) https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1430 
[https://perma.cc/TP7Y-X92U]. 
47. See Karen Allen, ICC Throws Spotlight on African Injustice, BBC (Dec. 
16, 2010), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12003954 
[https://perma.cc/ES6D-2RBH]. 
48. Sarah M. H. Nouwen, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE 
CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA 
AND SUDAN 8 (2013). 
49. See Understanding the International Criminal Court, supra note 37. 
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up being someone with no experience in building actual cases in an 
international tribunal. It is the Prosecutor who drives the OTP, and 
the next Prosecutor will have to be single-minded about bringing cases 
forward. He or she should ensure that every activity of the OTP is 
oriented towards that goal; only a chief Prosecutor who understands 
the ins and outs of international criminal investigations will know how 
to drive the institution to that objective, overcoming inertias and 
entrenched practices along the way.  
And in order to bring more cases, the Prosecutor should shift the 
orientation of the office towards smaller cases. Already, in its last 
Strategic Plan, the OTP allowed for the possibility of charging lower-
level cases50, but the new Prosecutor should embrace this option more 
fully and make it the norm. This approach will be controversial and a 
break in established practice; every single international criminal 
tribunal since Nuremberg has focused on prosecuting those most 
responsible.51 While that mandate is not explicitly set forth in the Rome 
Statute,52 it has been embraced as a goal of the OTP by both the first 
and second Prosecutors.53 And if the office brings smaller cases, it is 
certain that it will receive criticism.54 Commentators will complain that 
these prosecutions are unfair, that they are not strategic, and that the 
institution is squandering its resources.55 But the ICC’s design 
challenges mean it will be able to bring cases against high-level accused 
in the first instance only in rare circumstances.56 If the OTP wants 
cases, and particularly if it wants a lot of cases, the Prosecutor will 
have to embrace bringing smaller prosecutions. In most cases the choice 
will not be, at least as an initial matter, between high-level cases and 
lower-level ones, but rather between lower-level ones and no cases at 
all.  
 
50. Alex Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals Important Strategy Shift in New 
Policy Document, JUST SECURITY (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/64153/icc-prosecutor-signals-important-
strategy-shift-in-new-policy-document/ [https://perma.cc/QG6R-6VMC] 
[hereinafter Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals]. 
51. Id. 
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 27. 
53. See ICC Situations and Cases, COALITION INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/icc-situations-and-cases 
[https://perma.cc/7GV6-JTS8]. 
54. Cf. Darryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal 
Court Cannot Win, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 323 (2015) (discussing how, no 
matter what position the ICC takes, it will receive criticism for being 
either too aligned with state interests, “apologist”, or not aligned with 
state interests enough, “utopian”) . 
55. See id. at 336.  
56. See Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals, supra note 50.  
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To date, the Prosecution has only brought a few cases a year and 
at times has had only a single trial ongoing.57 If it focuses on smaller 
cases, there is the potential to bring many more cases at the same time 
which could fundamentally alter the functioning of the court in positive 
ways. First, it will give the court an opportunity to show that it can 
function in its core mission. It is difficult to imagine the court 
succeeding in any other respect if it cannot succeed there. Second, a 
busy court will force all of the actors at the court – the prosecution, 
registry, judges, and even the defense – to become more efficient and 
practical. When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia became busier, it found ways to conduct the trials more 
efficiently without a loss in effectiveness or fairness.58 Third, 
prosecutions of lower-level cases will create political pressure, within 
the situation country and internationally, to pursue higher-level 
perpetrators, which could open up avenues of cooperation that could 
advance such cases. Put another way, a central complaint against the 
pursuit of lower-level cases will be that it is unfair; one way to address 
this unfairness will be to go after the more senior actors. Moreover, 
prosecutions of the smaller cases could produce evidence and witnesses 
allowing for stronger prosecutions of higher-level officials. Fourth, 
prosecutions of core acts of criminality will pave the way for national 
prosecutors within the state and in other states to bring forward their 
own cases (based either on local or on universal jurisdiction). In sum, 
prosecuting a multitude of cases will energize and legitimize the court, 
help it function effectively and efficiently, and galvanize support for 
justice more broadly.  
As a second objective, the new Prosecutor should focus the work of 
the office on those situations that are likely to generate actual cases. 
This is tricky because it is not always predictable; both the 
investigations into atrocities and the political circumstances allowing 
for arrests can unfold in unpredictable ways. Many of the surrenders or 
arrests of high-level actors occurred in cases that seemed, at their 
beginning, almost hopeless.59 Moreover, at times it may be necessary to 
open an investigation into a situation where fruitful investigations are 
impossible simply as a placeholder for future possible action. But to say 
that investigations can unfold in unpredictable ways is not the same as 
saying that the outcomes of investigations are completely unpredictable. 
And the need for the institution to focus its investigative efforts requires 
it to make choices. The only way to make those choices are to 
 
57. See Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International 
Crimes in National Courts, 90 INDIANA L. J. 829, 839 (2015).  
58. See Alex Whiting, The ICTY as a Laboratory of International Criminal 
Procedure, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Bert Swart et al. eds., 2011). 
59. See Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives, supra note 36, 
at 129. 
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concentrate on the gravest situations and the ones where actual cases 
appear to be a likely, or at least a possible, outcome.  
Third, in addition to taking steps to improve the quality of the 
OTP’s investigations, the Prosecutor should consider what institutional 
design elements are within his or her control and could be adjusted. 
Many aspects of the design cannot be changed. It is not likely that the 
budget of the ICC will be dramatically increased, or that states will 
suddenly make cooperation with the court a priority above all others. 
However, within the court, the Prosecutor could consider ways to 
improve the cumbersome procedures at the court, working with the 
judges to produce more sensible approaches to some of the key stages 
of the proceedings.60 At a minimum, the Prosecutor should look for 
opportunities to propose more streamlined processes. Moreover, the 
Prosecutor should focus on the office’s human resources policies and 
consider ways to encourage some turnover to allow for fresh energy and 
new ideas. The office could adopt presumptive term limits for certain 
positions, limit internal promotions, and consider other measures that 
would encourage staff to consider moving to other institutions after a 
stint at the court. None of these steps will fundamentally alter the 
character of the court, but they could help bring its design more in line 
with its mission.  
The current challenges of the court are existential. To survive, it 
will be essential for the court to prove that it can succeed in its core 
mission of prosecuting cases. That will require a shift to prosecuting 
smaller cases and focusing the work of the court. This will be a 
departure from the approach of the ICC and the other international 
tribunals that preceded it, but in fact a return to the essence of what 
the court is.  
 
 
60. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Politics, Procedure, and Law: Three Continuing 
Challenges for the ICC in its Third Decade, ICC FORUM (June 28, 2018), 
https://iccforum.com/anniversary#Sadat [https://perma.cc/86JP-
NAX3]. 
